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“But it is not getting any safer!”: The Contested 
Dynamic of Framing Canada’s Military Mission 
in Afghanistan  
BROOKS DECILLIA London School of Economics  
 
Abstract. The Canadian government and military struggled to control its media framing of the war in 
Afghanistan between 2006 and 2009. This content analysis (n=900) critically investigates the 
mediated dynamic of framing Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. This study found that while 
journalists overwhelmingly indexed their stories to elite sources, they frequently impeached the 
frames sponsored by government and military leaders. Journalists used elite criteria to fact check the 
frames of military and government leaders. Most of the coverage was episodic and event-oriented 
rather than thematic and contextual. While Canadian journalists challenged official claims of 
improving security, for instance, their coverage lacked context and critical appraisal of Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan, raising questions about journalism’s normative role in Canadian 
democracy.  
Résumé. Le gouvernement canadien et les militaires se sont efforcés de contrôler la présentation de la 
guerre en Afghanistan par les médias entre 2006 et 2009. Cette analyse de la couverture médiatique (n 
= 900) examine de façon critique la dynamique médiatisée de l’encadrement de la mission militaire du 
Canada en Afghanistan. Cette étude a révélé que tandis que les journalistes ont dans leur grande 
majorité fondé leurs reportages sur des sources d’élite, ils ont fréquemment boudé les cadres soutenus 
par le gouvernement et les chefs militaires. Les journalistes ont privilégié des critères d’élite pour 
vérifier factuellement les cadres des dirigeants militaires et gou- vernementaux. La couverture était en 
grande partie épisodique et axée sur les événements plutôt que d’ordre thématique ou contextuel. 
Alors que les journalistes canadiens ont remis en question des allégations officielles concernant 
l’amélioration de la sécurité, par exemple, leur couverture a manqué de contexte et d’appréciation 
critique de la mission militaire du Canada, soulevant des interrogatifs sur le rôle normatif du 
journalisme dans le cadre de la démocratie canadienne.  
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The young Canadian man who died in service of his Afghan counterpart 
was sent off home last night. Into the warm and deceptively benevolent 
spring night—with songbirds, confused by the lights in the big hangar 
optimistically called Taliban’s Last Stand, chirping as thousands of army 
boots moved with surprising quiet onto the darkened tarmac... (Blatchford 
2006)  
Canadian journalist Christie Blatchford proudly admired Canadian 
soldiers serving in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011. The veteran 
columnist wrote vividly and affectionately about Canada’s military men 
and women. Accused by her critics of cheerleading for Canadian soldiers 
and the war (Solga, 2009), other more academic assessments concluded 
that Blatchford—and all Canadian journalists1 —failed to serve Canadian 
audiences effectively (Bergen, 2009; Maloney, 2015). Considerable 
research, especially in the US context, suggests that journalists frequently 
fail to live up to their normative watchdog role during times of war, often 
acting as nothing more than stenographers, echoing and amplifying, 
uncritically, the rhetoric of military and political leaders (Bennett et al., 
2007; Hallin,1986; Massing, 2004).  
Fletcher and Hove (2012) examined (in this journal) the role emotions 
played in Canadians’ support for the war in Afghanistan. Similarly, 
Fletcher and colleagues (2009: 925) concluded (also in this journal) that 
the Canadian government’s “information transmission” about the war in 
Afghanistan (despite the low public support) succeeded. Little attention, 
however, has focused on the actual media messages available to 
Canadians during the conflict. If content is key to understanding media 
effect and how the news media might “exert their own unique shaping 
power” (Shoemaker and Reese, 2014: 4), then it follows that researchers 
investigate the actual content and interrogate what role (if any) Canadian 
journalists played in the “information transmission” Fletcher and col- 
leagues (2009: 925) describe. This study responds to this deficit, 
concluding that Canadians did not receive uncontested media messages 
sponsored by government and military leaders. Canadian journalists 
resisted and challenged—up to a point—the political rhetoric and 
justifications offered by officials. It is beyond the scope of this research to 
make claims about the effect on audiences of the media messages 
analyzed in this study. Media consumers are, undoubtedly, smart and 
active (Livingstone, 2000), factoring their own experience and popular 
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wisdom into political decision making (Gamson,1992). Moreover, 
Bennett and Iyengar (2008) provocatively argue that media effects are 
increasingly minimal because of the growth of social media and the rising 
detachment of individuals from mainstream media.  
Canada Goes to War  
The Conservative government of Stephen Harper and the Department of 
National Defence strategically marketed Canada’s combat operations in 
Afghanistan (2006–2011) as part of a noble effort to (1) make 
Afghanistan safe; (2) rout terrorists; (3) help women and children; (4) 
provide microfinance to Afghans; (5) clear land mines; (6) support the 
democratically elected government; and (7) police the war-torn nation 
(Canada, 2007). An investigation by The Canadian Press uncovered that 
the Conservative government “script[ed] the words it wanted to hear from 
the mouths of its top diplomats, aid workers and cabinet ministers in 
2007–2008 to divert public attention from the soaring double-digit death 
toll of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan” (Blanchfield and Bronskill, 
2010). Moreover, a report commissioned by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs concluded that the Harper government’s public comments about 
the war were “too American,” suggesting that government and military 
officials instead use phrases such as “rebuilding, restoring, reconstruction, 
hope, opportunity, and enhancing the lives of women and children” in an 
effort to convince Canadians to support the conflict (Woods, 2007).2  
Canada’s media were the site of significant public debate about 
Afghanistan; and this study examines them “as both an agent and a 
venue” with an eye to understanding how journalistic practices may have 
“contest[ed] the ways in which we think and talk about policy issues” 
(Kosicki and Pan, 1997: 8). As Gitlin rightly explains, the media are “a 
significant social force in the forming and delimiting of public 
assumptions, attitudes, and moods” (2003 [1980]: 9). Furthermore, to 
better understand normative conceptions of media, war coverage “should 
not be seen as a special case of how the media works” but a close-up look 
at “many of the things that happen in peacetime” (Williams, 1992: 158; 
see also Carruthers, 2000). With a mind to situating this research’s 
methodology and empirical findings theoretically, the coming section 
turns to conceptual understandings of journalism, indexing and framing.  
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Normative Roles of the Media  
Christians and colleagues (2009) offer a useful theoretical conception of 
journalism’s normative role in democracies. Journalists, in this mode, can 
take on four roles: (1) monitorial; (2) facilitative; (3) radical; and (4) 
collaborative. The philosophical underpinning of Canada’s news media 
flows from liberal thinking and is premised largely on the assumption that 
journalists, in line with Christians and colleagues’ thinking, are 
monitorial, fulfilling a watchdog and truth-speaker function (Ward, 2015). 
Journalists, in this conception, disseminate objective truth with a mind to 
empowering citizens (Mill, 1991 [1859]) so they can make informed 
decisions and legitimate  democratic decisions (Habermas, 1989 [1962]). 
This model, it is often argued, protects democracies from the tyranny of 
the majority and the over- reach of the state (Schumpeter, 2003 [1943]). 
Yet journalism does not always live up to its normative conceptions 
(Schudson, 1995).  
Indexing  
News organizations focus on—and implicitly place greater emphasis on— 
what elites do and say. Journalists “tend to index the range of voice and 
viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views 
expressed in mainstream government debate” (Bennett, 1990: 106; italics 
in original). This conception flows from the normative assumption that 
journalists are honest brokers of information in a democracy who 
represent the “legitimate” and “credible” views of elected representatives 
(Bennett, 1990: 107). Elites—cabinet ministers, members of parliament, 
military officials, senior civil servants, judges, experts, academics—have 
“privileged access to (and greater claims on) media coverage” because of 
their “status” or “claims to expert knowledge” (McCullagh, 2002: 68). 
Drawing on previous research (Gans, 1979; Hallin, 1986; Tuchman, 
1978), Bennett (1990) hypothesized that news media closely adhere to 
elite communication, echoing and amplifying hegemonic views. Elites, in 
this conception, are not unified. Different perspectives, from different 
elites (government MPs versus opposition MPs, experts and pundits, for 
example), frequently get represented in the media. Entman’s cascading 
activation model (2003), in fact, envisions different levels of government, 
journalists and even the public shaping how news gets framed. 
Conversely, Althaus (2003) argues that journalists frequently resist the 
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power of indexing, incorporating their insider view (from years of 
experience as beat reporters and off-the-record sources) into their 
reporting, ensuring that their stories do not end up only parroting elite 
discourse. As the coming discussion details, journalists do have the power 
to resist the powerful frames of elites, but do not necessarily do it always 
or effectively.  
In times of war, government and military officials tend to be the dominant 
sources of information for most news organizations (Hallin, 1986; Zaller 
and Chiu, 1996). Media coverage tends to align with hegemonic 
interpretations and positions during these times of conflict (Domke et al., 
2006; Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Embedded journalists—attached to 
military units during war—frequently get accused of echoing and 
amplifying military and political leaders’ framing of the war (Knightly, 
2003) because reporters feel “an affinity with the troops, a shared 
determination to see the venture through to the end” (Morrison and 
Tumber, 1988: 97). Lewis and colleagues (2006: 154), on the other hand, 
found no evidence of bias from embedded journalists covering the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003—but their research did conclude that war zone 
reportage turns the conflict into a story that ultimately forces larger more 
critical questions about the war “into the background.”  
In line with Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model (2014), 
institutional factors such as embedding can shape and frame news 
content. Canadian journalists embedded with the military in Kandahar 
lived, slept, ate and were in harm’s way with Canadian Forces (Potter, 
2014). There was no censorship, per se. The military did not vet 
journalists’ stories before publication and all conversations with Canadian 
Forces were on the record (Henderson, 2006). Journalists agreed to 
certain conditions in order to be embedded with the military, including 
not revealing future troop movements. As well, reporters were prevented 
from disseminating any information that commanders in Kandahar 
“restricted for operational reasons” (Lamarche, 2013). Journalists, not 
surprisingly, complained that the military used the restriction pell-mell to 
the point where it “became like a moving yard stick throughout the whole 
war” (Lamarche, 2013). While there was no censorship, there were, 
arguably, discursive implications. Hallin (1986: 117), of note, concluded 
that journalists’ reliance on official sources during conflict produced 
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“spheres” of “consensus” and “legitimate controversy” in line with 
hegemonic interpretations and positions. Having offered an overview of 
the potential shaping power of embedding and indexing, this discussion 
transitions to out- lining the theoretical contours of framing.  
Framing  
Framing remains a “fractured paradigm” (Entman 1993: 51). Frames also 
lead a “double life” (D’Angelo, 2002: 873). They are both strategic 
rhetoric used by elites and journalists and the intellectual scaffolding used 
by audiences to interpret news (Kinder and Sanders, 1990). Social 
constructivists, for their part, put journalists at the centre of the framing 
practice, creating “interpretive packages” that often reflect their source’s 
preferred frames (Gamson and Mogdilianai, 1989: 3; italics in original). 
Furthermore, news reports are frequently framed by reporters as either 
episodic—“events oriented [and] concrete instances”—or thematic, 
context-laden “abstract” motifs or “back- grounder” pieces (Iyengar, 
1991: 14). Notably, Iyengar concluded that episodic framing trivializes 
public discourse, “prevent[ing] the public from cumulating the evidence 
towards any logical, ultimate consequence” (1992: 48). For the purposes 
of this research, frames are conceptualized as the way elites spotlight 
conflict, aiming to accomplish four important tasks: “problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” 
(Entman, 1993: 52; italics in original).  
As noted in the introduction, the Conservative government of Stephen 
Harper purposely scripted its rhetoric in support of Canada’s NATO-led 
military mission in Afghanistan. Dimitri Soudas, Harper’s former director 
of communication, details in his master’s thesis how governments 
effectively “manipulate” public opinion through the media (2015). While 
Soudas’ claim of manipulation is debatable, it is, of course, a long-
established practice for political actors to attempt to advance their 
agendas with strategic communication (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; 
McNair, 2000). Politicians hope their media messages provide citizens 
“influential cues” (Callaghan and Schnell, 2005: 2) “that promote their 
preferred vision of reality” (Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 199).  
News professionals also frequently fact check, interrogate, challenge, and 
even reject the framing sponsored by political actors (Cook, 2005; Dobbs, 
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2012; Graves, 2016). The proclivity of journalists to challenge frames 
sponsored by elites happens, in part, because of journalistic routines and 
socialization, events, technology, counterspin, and ideological and 
institutional forces (Shoemaker and Reese, 2014). The growth of 
interpretive journalism has increased the “policing of publicity relevant 
lies, spin and misdirection” (Schudson, 2013: 169). Uscinski and Butler 
(2013: 163) define fact checking as the process of “comparing” the 
statements of elites “to ‘the facts’ so as to determine whether a statement 
about these topics is a lie.” Jones (2009: 2–3), of note, argues this 
“accountability news” aims to hold political actors culpable for their 
statements.  
Events often disrupt the framing power of elites. Baum and Groeling offer 
their elasticity of reality concept as a means of understanding how elites 
often have more framing authority in times of war initially but that power 
wanes over time as reporters “are better able to discern for them- selves 
what is actually happening on the ground” (2010: 34). When no weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), for instance, were found in Iraq (which 
contradicted the major rationale invoked by both American and British 
leaders for going to war in 2003), journalists increasingly reflected a less-
unified picture about the rationale for the military invasion of the Middle 
Eastern country and gave more prominence to anti-war frames (Baum and 
Groeling, 2010). Furthermore, journalistic ethics and professional norms 
require news practitioners to be skeptical and questioning (Tuchman, 
1978). Moreover, when elites disagree about an issue, those dissenting 
voices become even more newsworthy (Hallin, 1986).  
Journalistic fact checking often comes in the form of rational and 
technical claims. While most journalists and media scholars reject notions 
of objectivity (Ward, 2015), journalists remain normatively objective in 
their method or work routines (Kovach and Rosentiel, 2014). Moreover, 
reporters tend to impeach elite rhetoric with elite standards (Ettema and 
Glasser, 1998). Sometimes, when critical voices are not readily available, 
journalists themselves are “compelled to challenge the official version of 
events” so as to include “tension and conflict that would otherwise be 
absent from their stories” and thus inure themselves and their news 
organizations against charges of bias (Cook, 2005: 106; see also Mermin, 
1996). Interviews with Canadian journalists who covered the conflict in 
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Afghanistan found that these reporters believed they possessed a 
professional obligation to challenge frames promoted by Canadian 
government and military leaders (DeCillia, 2009). Echoing Tuchman 
(1978), Bennett argues most adversarial actions by journalists constitute a 
“[r]itualistic posture of antagonism,” ultimately “creat[ing] the 
appearance of mutual independence while keeping most news content to 
political perspective certified by authorities” (2012: 202).  
Numerous conceptual frameworks (see Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980) shed 
light on how media content gets shaped. This study uses Shoemaker and 
Reese’s hierarchical influences model (2014) as a conceptual springboard 
for understanding and testing how indexing, framing and journalistic 
practices influenced the coverage of Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan. The “routines” and “ideological positions” of Canadian 
journalists, arguably, also played a significant role in shaping the content 
they produced about the conflict in Afghanistan (7–8). This study poses 
two research questions:  
1. What (if any) role did indexing play in the news media’s coverage of 
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan?   
2. What role (if any) did journalists play in contesting or perpetuating the 
preferred frames of the military and government surrounding 
Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan?   
The next section turns to outlining the methods and rationale for testing 
this work’s research questions.  
Methodology  
To examine this study’s research questions surrounding indexing and 
framing, a classic content analysis (CA) offered a reliable tool for 
quantifying media practice and content. Advocates of CA (Bauer, 2007; 
Krippendorff, 2013; Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe et al., 1998) contend the 
method offers an efficient means of quantifying and analyzing media 
phenomena. Moreover, the method offers an effective tool for identifying 
and analyzing indexing, framing and the reaction of journalists to elite-
sponsored frames. The public debate about Canada’s controversial 
military mission in Kandahar essentially ended with a confidence motion 
 9 
in Canada’s House of Commons in March 2008, pledging that Canadian 
Forces would stay until the end of 2011 (Canadian Press, 2014). 
Moreover, of the 158 Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan, 132 died 
between 2006 and 2009 (CBC, 2014). Therefore, this CA restricted its 
corpus to the most intense period of public debate: 2006–2009.  
Using the online news archive Infomart.com, the search terms 
“Afghanistan” and “Canada” defined a potential sampling frame of 8,967 
stories produced by CBC, CTV, The National Post and The Globe and 
Mail.3 This research’s systematic sample (n = 900) represents4 10 per cent 
of the nearly 9,000 stories about Canada’s combat operations in 
Afghanistan identified by the online news media archive between 2006 
and 2009.5 The samples,6 split almost evenly among the four years, were 
drawn from The Globe and Mail (29.1%), The National Post (25.6%), 
CBC Radio News (21.4%) and CTV National News (23.9%).7  
Using Entman’s (1993) definition of framing as a starting point, a careful 
reading of media texts, government documents, news releases and 
government speeches revealed persistent themes and elite sponsored 
frames surrounding Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. This 
inductive process led to this study’s coding categories.8 This study’s 
theory- driven coding focused on assessing (1) how journalists may have 
indexed their coverage to military and government sources; (2) the 
presence of military and government frames; and (3) how (if at all) 
journalists adopted, fact checked, interrogated or impeached the frames 
sponsored by government and military leaders.9 Ten per cent of the entire 
sample was randomly coded a second time by an independent researcher. 
This validation process produced an intercoder reliability above 80 per 
cent for all of the variables.10 Reliability higher than 80 per cent points 
towards a well- defined coding scheme and a robust sampling validity that 
can stand the test of being replicated (Bauer, 2007; Krippendorff, 2013).  
Results: Framing and Challenging  
Research question one assesses what role indexing played in the news 
media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. Military 
and government officials comprise nearly half (47.3%) of the primary 
sources in the news media (see Figure 1).  
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More than four in ten (44.7%) news media accounts of Afghanistan did 
not include a secondary source (see Figure 2). When media coverage does 
contain a secondary source, official government and military sources 
again  
FIGURE 1   - Primary Sources (n = 900)  
  
 
FIGURE 2 - Secondary Sources (n = 900)  
 
 
comprise the largest percentage at 26.2 per cent. Statistical analysis (two- 
sided Fisher’s exact test [FET]) found that embedded journalists relied 
more heavily on military (45.3%) officials as primary sources than 
journalists in Canada (19.2%), p < .001, FET. Of note, journalists based in 
Canada covering aspects of the military mission were more likely (19.1%) 
to include opposition politicians in their coverage than embedded 
journalists in Afghanistan (5.8%), p < .001, FET. As well, voices outside 
of the government and military (opposition politicians, academics, non-
governmental organizations) increased as a percentage of primary sources 
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from 22 per cent in 2006 to an average of 27.25 per cent for the four 
years, p < .020, FET. Similarly, voices outside of the government and 
military increased as secondary sources in media coverage from 22.9 per 
cent in 2006 to an average of 27.6 per cent between 2006–2009, p < .001, 
FET.  
With respect to the focus of the media, combat operations, death and 
injuries, military equipment and reconstruction and development are the 
spotlight of nearly six in ten reports (58.3%) in the coverage about 
Afghanistan (see Figure 3). The protracted parliamentary debate about 
when Canadian Forces should leave Kandahar accounts for more than a 
quarter (27.3%) of the spotlight of the news media coverage of 
Afghanistan. Most of the coverage (90%) was episodic compared to 
thematic (10%) in nature. Coverage based in Canada (12.3%) was two 
times more likely to be thematic than coverage produced by embedded 
journalists in Afghanistan (6.2%), c2(3, N = 900) = 8.907, p = .038.  
Research question two aims to assess what role journalists played in 
contesting or perpetuating the preferred frames of the military and 
government surrounding Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. 
Consistent with the Harper government’s efforts to systematically author 
the media messages coming out of its officials’ mouths, preferred 
frames—those sponsored by government and military leaders—are 
present at least once in 76.4 per cent of the media coverage about the 
conflict in Afghanistan.  
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Figure 3 - Focus of News Coverage (n = 900)  
 
 
Moreover, much of the coverage (34.9%) contains multiple frames in the 
same news report, commentary, editorial or letter to the editor (see Figure 
4). News and commentary about the war in Afghanistan frequently, for 
instance, coupled reconstruction with safety and security frames (49.7%), 
c2(1, N = 900) = 187.136, p = .001.  
When the preferred frames of government and military leaders are present 
in the news, government and Canadian Forces officials are the largest 
(52.9%) sponsors of these frames, c2(11, N=900)=817.381, p = .001 (see 
Figure 5). A newspaper headline from 2008, for example, quoting 
military leaders, reads: “Fine Canadians, courageous men; Three slain 
soldiers are remembered for their bravery, dedication and love of 
adventure.” In the story, Prime Minister Harper praises the dead soldiers’ 
“selfless service” to Canada, “while helping to ensure a brighter future for 
the Afghan people” (Moore, 2008). Journalists (24%) were the  
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FIGURE 4 -   Preferred Government / Military Frames (n = 900)  
 
 
second largest sponsor of preferred government and military frames. This 
adoption of the government and military’s preferred frame(s) often came 
in commentaries and editorials. In a column entitled “A soldier’s motto: 
Always come back for your friends,” The Globe and Mail, for example, 
highlights Warrant Officer Willy MacDonald’s bravery, describing how 
the soldier “with machine-gun fire and RPGs raining down on him” 
helped his wounded comrades (Blatchford, 2009).  
Of note, more than three-quarters (76.5%) of the media coverage 
containing a preferred government or military frame also contained a 
challenge to or fact check of that frame, c2(1, N = 900) = 390.035, p = 
.001. Typical of this approach, The Globe and Mail’s Graham Smith 
challenges Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff claims of improving security, 
writing: “Canada’s top soldier has dismissed the growing violence in 
Kandahar as ‘insignificant,’ contradicting all public data and highlighting 
the growing gap between Canada’s upbeat view of the war and the sober 
analysis from other NATO countries” (2008; italics added). The news 
story then offers a lengthy list of statistics fact checking the general’s 
claim about improving security. This study’s statistical analysis 
confirmed an association between this type of elite framing and 
challenges or fact checking sponsored by a journalist (63.9%, p < .001, 
FET). Journalists themselves (and not opposition politicians or critics of 
the war) presented the largest and most sustained challenge to government 
and military framing in the news media coverage of Afghanistan. Simply 
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put, journalists fact checked the preferred frames of government and 
military leaders. The challenges by journalists grew over time, too. In 
2006, just less than half (49.8%) of the news media coverage about 
Afghanistan contained a fact check of a government or military frame. 
Challenges to elite rhetoric grew to 64.4 per cent in 2007; dropped to 56.7 
per cent in 2008; and then rose to 62 per cent in 2009, c2(3, N = 900) = 
11.266, p = .010. It is also worth noting that 79 per cent of the coverage 
that featured an opposition politician as a primary or secondary source 
also contained a challenge to a government or military preferred frame, p 
< .001, FET.  
FIGURE 5 - Frame Sponsor (n = 900)  
  
More than three-quarters (76.9%) of news and commentary makes note—
if only briefly—of the seemingly perpetual violence and precarious 
security in Afghanistan. In a Globe and Mail feature about training 
Afghan police officers, for example, the story ends pessimistically, 
stressing that insurgents were increasingly killing Canadian soldiers with 
suicide bombers and roadside improvised explosive devices (Koring and 
Dobrota, 2007). Mentions of the deteriorating security in Afghanistan 
increased from 76.1 per cent in 2006 to 77.8 per cent in 2007. Concerns 
about security rose again to 82.8 per cent in 2008 before falling below the 
four-year average of 76.9 to 70.9 per cent in 2009, c2(3, N = 900) = 9.610, 
p = .025. Of note, 85.4 per cent of samples containing a mention of safety 
or security also contained a challenge or impeachment (overwhelmingly 
authored by a journalist) of the preferred government or military frames, 
c2(1, N = 900) = 51.130, p = .001.  
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To be sure, the media coverage of Canada’s role in Afghanistan did 
contain other critiques of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. 
Independent of the fact checking of government and military framing, the 
news media, for instance, highlighted numerous concerns about the 
treatment of detainees (6.1% of the coverage). Writing about turning 
Afghan detainees over for torture, columnist Rick Salutin charges the 
practice would spark recrimination among Muslims and inspire more 
terrorism (2009). Yet, as this study’s CA illustrates, most of the 
journalistic challenges come in the form of fact checking the military and 
government’s stated goals and progress on those objectives. The next 
section turns to a discussion of this study’s research questions and the 
findings outlined above.  
Indexing  
Canadian journalists largely indexed their coverage to government and 
military leaders. Yet, in contrast to considerable US-focused research (for 
example, Bennett et al., 2006; Zaller and Chiu 1996), Canada’s news 
media were not docile streams of unfiltered messages of government and 
military leaders. Journalists did fact check what government and military 
leaders were saying about the war. Furthermore, this study’s data 
illustrate well how elites do not represent a singular—and unified—block 
(Gramsci, 1971). There are clear battle lines and different groups framed 
the war in different ways. Moreover, the inclusion of opposition 
politicians in cover- age of the war increased the chances of government 
and military framing getting contested. Canada’s minority parliament 
likely played a role in this phenomenon and illustrates how elites are not 
monolithic. Indexing theory holds that elite disagreement often leads 
journalists to produce more critical coverage of issues and events 
(Bennett, 1990). Canada’s Parliament was split over the question of 
Afghanistan. Both the Bloc Québécois and the New Democratic Party 
eventually came to demand that Canadian Forces withdraw from 
Afghanistan (Saideman, 2016). Parliamentary motions extending the 
mission were largely brokered between the ruling Conservatives and the 
official opposition Liberal party (BBC, 2008). Even some Liberals, whose 
party initially committed Canadian troops to Kandahar while in power in 
2005, questioned Canada’s commitment to the conflict while in 
opposition (Bratt, 2007). Furthermore, US President George W. Bush’s 
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handling of the Iraq war made him increasingly unpopular in 2005 and 
2006 (Bennett et al., 2007).  
Canadian political actors were no doubt aware of the growing public 
skepticism about both the war in Afghanistan and Iraq internationally and 
at home. Canadian journalists, arguably, cued to this concern, fuelling 
their challenges to the Harper government’s framing of the war in 
Afghanistan. Entman (2003) also predicts political actors are often vocal 
or silent based on public mood. Opposition politicians who did not 
support combat operations in Afghanistan likely felt emboldened to speak 
more critically about the war with opinion polls showing a drop in public 
support for military mission in the first year of the conflict (CTV, 2007). 
This public discontent, in turn, was reflected in the news media’s growing 
skepticism about the conflict.  
As well, politicians need to manage their relationship with news 
professionals in order to increase the chances of their preferred frame(s) 
being adopted by journalists (Entman, 2004). The acrimonious 
relationship between the Conservative government and the news media 
(Martin, 2010; Wilson, 2006), arguably, heightened skepticism among 
journalists about the government’s framing efforts. A panel of prestigious 
Canadians appointed by the Conservative government to study 
Afghanistan concluded, in fact, that the Harper government “failed to 
communicate with Canadians with balance and candour” about the 
conflict (Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, 
2008: 20). Journalists experienced that lack of sincerity first hand. This in 
turn made journalists mistrustful of the Harper government’s framing of 
the conflict (DeCillia, 2009).  
Reality versus Government and Military Framing  
The literature surrounding indexing and framing depicts two competing 
visions of journalism’s power to challenge hegemony. In the one camp 
(Baum and Groeling, 2010), journalists frequently challenge elite framing 
and represent an “independent, strategic actor in the policy-making 
process” (Potter and Baum, 2010: 455). In the other camp, journalists are 
often depicted as stenographers whose content is predominantly shaped 
by dominant ideology (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Bennett and  
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colleagues (2007), notably, conclude that journalists’ reliance on official 
sources precipitated a spectacular failure by the news media leading up to 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. As noted earlier, Baum and Groeling 
(2010) contend journalistic counterframing to elite rhetoric concerning 
war grows over time when journalists obtain more information firsthand. 
The passage of time allows journalist to critique government and military 
leaders’ rationale for war against facts on the ground.  
This research offers a different insight into indexing and framing, high- 
lighting that while Canadian journalists did largely index their coverage 
largely to officials, they challenged government and military frames from 
the beginning of Canada’s combat operations in Kandahar. Moreover, the 
Canadian coverage of Afghanistan conforms with the growing 
interpretive style (Schudson, 2013) and fact checking form (Graves, 
2016) of journal- ism over the last decade, raising questions about 
indexing theory’s predictive power that news content generally adheres to 
elite debate.  
From the onset of the war, Canadian journalists fact checked government 
and military claims of Canadians Forces making the volatile region safer, 
albeit their challenges increased over time. There was a clear association 
between frame contestation by journalists and mentions of safety and 
security in the news coverage. Canadian Forces were not making the 
volatile region of Kandahar safer as politicians and military officials kept 
claiming (United Nations, 2009). Journalists compared government and 
military leaders’ statements against their own observations or the facts in 
Kandahar to “determine” the truthfulness of elite framing (Uscinski and 
Butler, 2013: 163). “If the text frame emphasizes in a variety of mutually 
reinforcing ways that the glass is half full,” stresses Entman, “the 
evidence of social science suggests that relatively few in the audience will 
conclude it is half empty” (1993: 56). Reality asserted itself at the 
beginning of Canada’s combat operations in Kandahar, allowing 
reporters’ observations from the volatile region to impeach the preferred 
frames of the government and military early on in the conflict (Baum and 
Groeling, 2010). As well, the violent insurgency in nearby Iraq and the 
failure to find WMD arguably inoculated many Canadian journalists to 
what they would likely perceive as spin concerning the conflict in 
Afghanistan. By 2006, when Canada stepped up its military role in 
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Afghanistan, the increasing skepticism about the Iraq invasion among 
journalists seeped into the coverage and commentary about Afghanistan 
(DeCillia, 2009).  
Compared to the domestic journalists covering the conflict (and political 
debate surrounding the war), embedded journalists did not have readily 
available sources in Kandahar to critique the government and military’s 
framing. Lacking access to critical voices, embedded reporters in 
Afghanistan, in line with their professional conception, used their own 
observations and research to “challenge the official version of events” 
(Cook, 2005: 106). The tone of Canadian journalists’ coverage of the war  
“parallel[ed] objective indicators of reality” in Kandahar (Baum and 
Groeling, 2013: 35). Security was precarious in Kandahar from the start 
of Canada’s military mission in the region, and journalists were 
aggressive from the start of the mission about challenging officials’ 
perpetual optimistic frames of progress and improving security.  
Canadian journalists used elite criteria and definitions to judge and fact 
check the frames sponsored by officials. Government and military 
leaders’ frames were consistently assessed by elite-defined and 
administered “objective” rules, laws, standards and codes (Glasser and 
Ettema, 1989: 2). Journalists turned the government and military’s 
motivations and actions surrounding the military mission into quantitative 
or scientific criteria that they then assessed in their coverage. While the 
news media may have challenged the frames sponsored by elites, those 
frames still structured most of the stories, commentaries and editorials 
produced by journalists. Elite frames provided the intellectual scaffolding 
for journalistic production. As Bennett (2012) has argued, the news ritual 
of assessing and challenging political actors’ objectives produces 
distorted coverage. When Canadian journalists fact checked government 
and military framing, they still incorporated—and even highlight—the 
frames sponsored by political actors in their coverage. Contradicting a 
frame ultimately evokes that same frame (Lakoff, 2004). “[I]f you negate 
a frame, you have to activate the frame, because you have to know what 
you’re negating. If you use logic against something, you’re strengthening 
it” (Lakoff, as quoted in Rosenberg, 2017). In many ways, elite frames 
repeated in the media— even if they are contested—become “connected 
to and implicit in practical life” (Gramsci, 1971: 330). This practice, 
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arguably, moves beyond story- telling to producing “meaning in the 
service of power” (Thompson, 1990: 7; italics in original) and questions 
the power journalists possess to challenge elite framing, as Baum and 
Groeling (2010) describe.  
Ignoring the Bigger Questions  
Many academics and experts—and even some journalists—were offering 
less optimistic depictions and prognostications of the conflict early on in 
2006. International law expert Michael Byers (2006) told members of 
Parliament and senators in 2006 that combat in Afghanistan “was the 
wrong mission for Canada.” Academics also questioned Canada’s tactics 
(Greaves, 2008) in Afghanistan, while others doubted whether NATO 
countries such as Canada were equipped to deal with Afghanistan’s 
counterinsurgency, concluding the military organization’s “expectations 
of success were not realistic” (Kay and Khan, 2007: 163). Furthermore, a 
number of aid agencies also publicly chastised Canada for its focus on 
combat over reconstruction and development (Kairos, 2007).11 Counter-  
narratives and arguments contrasting the government and military’s 
preferred frames were publicly available. Despite this, journalists stuck to 
their usual events-oriented coverage, focusing their critiques on assessing 
the progress of government and military framing of the conflict. Simply 
put, journalistic counter-framing only went so far. All too frequently, 
though, there are discrepancies between “what ought to be” and the what 
is, as Gramsci noted (1971: 172; italics added).  
While Canadian journalists fact checked the frames sponsored by 
government and military leaders, larger macro or structural forces such as 
the interests of the military and the industries that support it were not 
widely addressed in the news media. The coverage was largely episodic 
and lacked thematic values such as context, pushing critical assessments 
“into the background” (Lewis et al., 2003). The news media coverage 
about Afghanistan was largely event-driven, without needed context and 
information. Critical—thematic—accounts of the war were, therefore, 
largely absent in the mainstream media. In line with Iyengar, the episodic 
news coverage produced by Canadian journalists, arguably, “trivialize[ed] 
... public discourse” (1991:143), echoing and amplifying elite positions 
and ideology. As well, the predominance of episodic coverage 
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presumably silenced important critical questions about war in mediated 
public dis- course. “There is not one but many silences,” contends 
Foucault, “and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and 
permeate dis- courses” (1990: 27). This privileging—through absence—
also represents an intangible power that is “most effective when least 
observable” (Lukes, 2005: 1).  
Normative Roles of the Media  
While journalists did fact check the government and military’s framing of 
the war, their largely episodic coverage—in the end—highlighted 
dominant interpretations. Their fact checking still integrated and 
spotlighted the frames sponsored by government and military leaders. 
Canadian journalists might argue that their challenges to military and 
government frames exemplify their role as a watchdog. Yet the binary 
ritual by which journalists used elite benchmarks to impeach the frames 
sponsored by government and military leaders arguably perpetuated 
hegemonic interpretations of the conflict. The practices of countering the 
rhetoric of elites by judging it against their own words and criteria 
arguably provided the Canadian public with a distorted view of the war. 
As this CA’s findings highlight, the news media’s meaning making is 
closely aligned with the dominant political and economic power system. 
Collaboration does not imply censor- ship. “Collaboration,” Christians 
and colleagues emphasize, “represents an acknowledgement of the state’s 
interest—to which the media accede either passively or unwittingly, 
reluctantly or wholeheartedly—in participating in the choices journalists 
make and the coverage they provide” (2009: 197).  
The abundance of events-oriented coverage over thematic (substantive 
and contextual) coverage further compounds concerns about the 
perpetuation of hegemonic interpretations in the news media. Journalists 
and their editorial leaders need to pay more attention to how episodic 
coverage can unwittingly perpetuate dominant meanings. Journalistic 
rigour requires more than simply using official yardsticks or values to 
discredit the frames of officials. This type of journalism is too 
reductionist, too simplistic. Ethical and dogged journalism requires more 
imagination, nuance and complexity. Informative journalism requires 
“more than what is contained within the power boundaries of the frame” 
(Durham, 2001: 134). There are not two sides, for instance, to climate 
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change. The BBC, by means of an example, was criticized in 2011 for its 
“over-rigid” application of impartiality in its coverage of climate change, 
giving “undue attention to marginal opinion” (BBC, 2011: 5). This form 
of journalism, argues Fallows, presents politics and public policy as a he-
said/she-said, everyone is to blame affair that occludes deeper 
understandings and leaves citizens “even more fatalistic and jaded about 
public affairs” (2016). This, of course, presents a worrying potential 
consequence for participatory democracies such as Canada (Lewis, 2001). 
Influence, after all, begins with politicians constructing the context and 
information people will use to make political decisions.  
Conclusion  
This research’s CA assessed two research questions concerning indexing 
and framing. While journalists largely indexed their coverage to 
government and military sources, they did challenge, to a degree, elite 
messages. Canadian journalists fact checked the preferred frames of 
government and military leaders with elite benchmarks. Yet, because their 
coverage was largely episodic, journalists failed to challenge more 
fundamental structural issues and justifications for the war.  
This study raises more questions than answers. While it offers, as 
Shoemaker and Reese (2014) urge, a systematic analysis of media content 
about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan, it does not offer insight 
into why journalists did what they did. Further research questioning 
journalists about their motivations may prove insightful. This study lays 
the ground work for further understanding of the media effect or “shaping 
power” of media (Shoemaker and Reese, 2014: 4). Fletcher and Hove 
(2012) and Fletcher and colleagues (2009) offer useful insight into what 
factors played a role in how Canadians felt about the war in Afghanistan. 
Subsequent audience research may be able to assess if media messages 
containing elite-sponsored frames and journalistic challenges or fact 
checking influence public opinions about war. So far, most fact checking 
effects research has focused on US audiences. Future studies should test 
the impact of fact checking on Canadians.  
Akin to Hallin’s analysis (1986) of the Vietnam War, Canadian 
journalists ultimately ended up echoing and amplifying the elite common 
sense about the conflict in Afghanistan. It is during times of war when 
 22 
democracies and citizens need critical and autonomous journalism the 
most (Jensen, 2003). Episodic, event-oriented coverage offers only 
“scattered morsels” and not sufficient information and context to allow 
the public to “gain wide understanding as a sensible alternative to” the 
interpretations sponsored by government and military leaders (Entman, 
2004: 17). “Too much of the press,” argues The Guardian’s Katherine 
Viner, “often exhibited a bias towards the status quo and a deference to 
authority” (2016). As this study shows, Canadians and democracy were 
ultimately not well served because journalists did not offer a more 
complete and critical account of Canada’s military role in a distant war.  
Notes  
. 1  As a journalist with CBC News, the author was twice embedded with Canadian 
Forces in Afghanistan.   
. 2  More than half (55%) of Canadians supported having soldiers in Afghanistan in 
March 2006 (Strategic Counsel, 2006). By the summer of 2009, a poll found a 
majority (54%) of Canadians did not want their soldiers in Kandahar (EKOS, 
2009).   
. 3  These news organizations were chosen for their reach. The Globe and Mail and The 
National Post are Canada’s two national newspapers. CTV and CBC Radio 
broadcast nationally and have large audiences.   
. 4  In line with Kensicki (2004), a representative sample is typical of the kind of media 
concerning Afghanistan and Canada.   
. 5  The author’s news reporting from Afghanistan was excluded from the sample.   
. 6  News/current affairs: 79.8 %; editorial and commentary: 12.8 %; letters to the editor: 
6.6  % ; and feature: 0.9 % .   
. 7  This research’s focus on national English media organizations is, admittedly, a 
limita  tion. An analysis of Quebec media about the conflict in Afghanistan is 
likely to yield  different results.   
. 8  A full coding schedule is available online at: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ 
 gm y2w xm vjcdd51s/A A A B N G W _0LqQ sG rK X EU B FJ1ga?dl=0    
. 9  This research’s text-based analysis of media samples is a limitation. To be sure, 
visual analysis of the framing of war has merits (Butler, 2009). This study’s 
primary focus, however, was quantifying framing and indexing. A detailed visual 
analysis is beyond the scope of this work.  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. 10  The intercoder reliability—including Scott’s pi, nominal Krippendorff’s alpha, and 
Cohen’s kappa—for all variables is available at: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ 
gmy2wxmvjcdd51s/AAABNGW_0LqQsGrKXEUBFJ1ga?dl=0   
. 11  The Harper government halted spending on Kairos in 2009 because of the aid 
group’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some leaders of Kaiors 
suspect the aid organization was politically targeted and then audited by Canada 
Revenue Agency (Curry, 2014).  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